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Is Delaware's Corporate Law
Too Big to Fail?
Mark J. Roe
An enduring inquiry for American corporate law scholars is why
Delaware dominates corporate chartering in the United States. Several
theories explain the result. I add another partial explanation: its large size
alone makes Delaware attractive to reincorporating firms by making the state's
corporate law more important to the American economy-and corporate
interest groups--than that of other states. Any single state with a small number
of incorporations could disrupt their firms' corporate structures without
inducing any repercussions in Washington. But Delaware-or really its
corporate law--is "too big to fail." Damaged players in other states would be
unable to enlist Washington to reverse the result. Nor would the low volume
players be wary of Washington's attention and the possibility of it over-
reacting if a major corporate issue reached its agenda. Delaware, though, as
home to about half of the American corporate economy, could not seriously
disrupt American business without repercussion.
INTRODUCTION
The question of why Delaware has been the premiere corporate
state is a continuing issue of academic inquiry, with explanations ranging
from Delaware catering to corporate managers, to it having efficient
judicial and responsive legislative decision-making, and to it providing
network externalities. I analyze here how Delaware stays big, in part, by
simply being big. Delaware, solely due to its large size in the corporate
chartering market, provides an advantage to corporations that other states
cannot provide. It is not just the network externalities of a (nearly)
national but made-in-Delaware corporate law, as has been appropriately
analyzed before. It is the additional characteristic that Washington would
have little reason to react if another of the fifty states seriously disrupted
their corporate legal structures, or sought to extract excessive value from
its corporations. But if Delaware did so, its actions would threaten
interests and, possibly, public well-being in a way that would induce
Washington to act. Delaware might fail locally in making American
corporate law, but its corporate law failure would not persist.
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The Article is based on part of the October
2007 Pomerantz lecture at Brooklyn Law School. Thanks go to Michal Barzuza, Henry Butler,
Martin Gelter, Jeffrey Gordon, Howell Jackson, Marcel Kahan, Donald Langevoort, Geoffrey
Miller, Edward Rock, and Guhan Subramanian for comments and discussion, and to Gregory
Dickinson for research assistance.
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There are two dimensions to the size effect. Managers,
shareholders, and their lawyers have reason to think that overall they do
better if most corporate decisions are made in Delaware; hence, they
have reason to scramble to make it unlikely that Washington would act
and put Delaware's corporate lawmaking on the national agenda. But, if
they fail in Delaware, they could as a last resort turn to Washington. And
if Delaware's corporate law was seen as creating national economic
issues, or if the state was unresponsive in a crisis, Washington's
eyebrows might be raised and it might act. If Delaware did not adjust in
either dimension-of responding to corporate interests or in being seen
as damaging the national economy-its corporate law would not be
allowed to persist without change or supplement. Washington would step
in. Delaware is too big to fail. Other states are not.
In Part I of this Article, I review several existing explanations for
Delaware's dominance, including the thinking that jurisdictional
competition is not strong and that the federal presence cannot be ignored
in corporate lawmaking. In Part II, I show how states with only a few
large firms could make errors without attracting national attention
because the national stakes would be too small; Delaware's disruptions,
however, would not go unnoticed, because its corporate law governs so
much of the American economy. In Part III, I extend this contrast,
showing that Washington's presence thus bolsters Delaware's stability,
but not that of other states. Finally, in Part IV, I further this contrast,
showing that Washington's presence limits the contestability of state
charter competition because once one corporate center emerges, new
ones, lacking the strength of this interaction with Washington, will be
relatively riskier.
I. THE STATUS OF ANALYSIS OF DELAWARE'S POSITION IN
MAKING AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
The classic view has been that Delaware dominates the
chartering market because it won, and continues to win, a competitive
race with other states. The "race view" divides into two sub-categories:
first, that the race provides an efficient corporate law, and second, that
the race provides insider decision-makers with law that favors them.
Recent thinking has advanced two propositions to modify the long-held
race perspective: that the race is weak and that Washington is effectively
the major alternative corporate lawmaker to Delaware.
A. The Race
For decades, the central academic view of Delaware and its role
in making American corporate law was that states competed for
corporate chartering revenues, with Delaware the leader in that race. In
the 1970s, the dominant view was first that of a race to the bottom,
particularly after Bill Cary's famous article appeared, in which he
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advanced the idea that states were bending over backwards to appeal to
managers over shareholders.' Thinking then shifted in key corporate
academic circles to viewing the race as more one to the top by providing
efficient corporate law, because some shareholder-oriented, managerial-
controlling rules would be too costly overall and because firms,
competing in capital markets, could not survive if hobbled by an
inefficient state corporate law.2  More analyses developed with
conclusions and explanations as to why the race must be more to the top
than the bottom.3
B. The New Thinking
The idea of a strong race dominated the academic literature for
some time, although disagreement persisted as to whether the race was to
the top or to the bottom. But the idea of the race being a strong one has
worn thin in recent academic work.
The numbers show that Delaware has had the lion's share of
incorporations for some time. Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar took our
understanding of this indicator a big step forward by showing that no
other state actively seeks the incorporation business, that no other state
has a corporate franchise tax structure such that it could profit by doing
so, and that Delaware is alone in the rechartering market. The few states
that tried to compete on one level or another have stopped doing so;
internal state politics stymied the effort. Local lawyers often saw
themselves as losing out to others if strong commercial, business, and
corporate courts emerged, so they lobbied against the effort and
I William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
2 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 251 (1977); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 21 (1993); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 920
(1982). For those embarking on a reading of the race debate, among the works that would need to be
consulted, in addition to those cited elsewhere in this Article, are the following: Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992); William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in
Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1994); William J. Carney, The Political Economy of
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1987). Recent contributions and advances come from: Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy
Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006); Renee M. Jones, Does
Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 879 (2006); Robert Ahdieh, The (Misunderstood) Genius of American Corporate Law, (Emory
Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 08-35, 2008), available at http://ssm.comabstract
=1105904.
3 See ROMANO, supra note 2, at 14-17, 60-75; Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 533 (2001) (advancing evidence that Delaware law
enhances shareholder value by as much as 5%); Fischel, supra note 2, at 921-23; Winter, supra note
2, at 254-58, 289.
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succeeded.4 Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani provided an economic
explanation for the lack of competition: a state that incurred the costs of
innovating around Delaware would often find that Delaware could copy
the innovation, deflating the new entrant's competitive advantage. The
potential competitor, aware of Delaware's potential to easily strike back,
would then have had little motivation to innovate in the first place.5
In a complementary analysis, I argued that the United States has
two primary corporate lawmakers: not just Delaware, but also the
American Congress (and Congress's direct "agents," such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the federal courts, and its
indirect ones, such as the stock exchanges, which often make listing rules
in the shadow of, or under the direction of, federal authorities). Hence,
Delaware is not alone in making American corporate law. Not only is it
not alone, but frequently the major corporate issue of the decade actually
goes federal or is discussed and debated in the federal arena.6
A weak race does not mean that Delaware feels no competitive
pressure. To better understand the pressure on Delaware, we must
interact the states' somnolence with America's business dynamism. Even
if no state actively competes with Delaware, business dynamism is so
substantial in the United States that a large fraction of Delaware's tax
base would disappear in a decade if Delaware did not get new firms into
its tax base. Delaware truncates its tax rate, in that mid-sized companies
pay as much as the very largest companies. Therefore, mergers,
acquisitions, and disappearances erode Delaware's tax base even more
quickly than American business turns over. Delaware must keep
convincing firms to reincorporate from their home state into Delaware,
even though it faces no important immediate competitor in the interstate
chartering market. While this is not the severe competition of the
economics textbook market of many producers fighting for the next sale,
it is more than no competition at all.7
Whatever the nature of the analysis, Delaware has some
advantage. Either it is racing and has an advantage, or it won a race and
has some persisting advantage, which it has not yet frittered away.
Several common explanations include rapid-response lawmaking,
warranties of stability tied to Delaware's dependence on the franchise
tax, high-quality judging, and network externalities.8 Although some
4 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 684, 687-93, 724-35 (2002).
5 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 593-95 (2002).
6 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-34 (2003).
7 See generally Mark J. Roe, Does Delaware Compete? (working paper, 2008) (on file
with author).
8 See Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143,
160-61 (2002) (Delaware's streamlined corporate law amendment process); Kahan & Kamar, supra
note 4, at 725-26 (state courts' judicial expertise); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law,
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 847 (1995) (network externalities); Roberta
[Vol. 74:1
DELAWARE'S BACKSTOP
have contested the centrality of these advantages, I do not contest them.
Instead, I seek to add to the list of Delaware's advantages by proposing
the possibility that Delaware-or, more properly, its corporate law-is
too big to fail. Delaware possesses a structural advantage over other
states because it has a corporate law that, if it went awry, could damage
the American economy. This power is also a constraint because
Delaware lawmakers-alone among state lawmakers-would face
federal consequences if its state-made corporate law was seen as having
gone awry. As a constraint and as an advantage, therefore, Delaware
cannot be allowed to make big mistakes or offend powerful corporate
interests. If it does not take care of a corporate problem, some other body
in the American economy or polity will.
I'll expand.
II. DELAWARE'S STABILITY
Delaware has provided a stable and efficacious but responsive
corporate law for decades. It reacts to business changes, it innovates
when needed, and, if it errs, it corrects the errors quickly. Other states
have fewer incentives and a lower capacity to be both stable and
accommodating. These considerations are often taken to be indicators of
a race to the top,9 although ones that in the modem analysis are not seen
as motivated by tight competition for franchise fees." Here, I further
unpack our understanding of Delaware's stability, first by examining
how local actors' motivations in Delaware differ from those in other
states. Delaware cannot stay out of the national spotlight, while other
states can.
A. State Politicians' Motivations versus Business Stability
State politicians in, say, California and Illinois have reason to
provide corporate law stability, but they also have reasons not to do so.
The main reason not to do so is that politicians' election-oriented time
horizons are shorter than those of business. Corporate law is a long-run
endeavor and politicians typically do not have the same long-run
horizons. Kahan and Kamar showed that this mismatch in horizons is a
reason why few states have tried to provide high-quality corporate law
on a continuing basis."
Moreover, and most importantly, mistakes happen. Most state
politicians, other than Delaware's, have limited reason to correct them,
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,
226-27 (1985) (stability).
9 ROMANO, supra note 2, at 38, who analyzes how Delaware bonds itself to provide an
attractive, stable corporate law through its dependence on the franchise tax.
10 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 687-93.
11 ld. at 729.
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because they have little at stake. And they have weak public-spirited
motivations to correct mistakes that affect the viability of out-of-state
businesses. Moreover, state politicians might find it tempting to take
something from those out-of-state businesses, to close a budget gap or to
relieve property taxes just before an election. Analysis to date has
focused on why Delaware is motivated to, and capable of, reacting
quickly in making corporate law that responds to current conditions.
These analyses, in my view, are correct, but more can be said.
B. If a Small State Goes Awry
Consider how the affected interests, firms, and Washington
would react if a state with only a few large firms went awry in making
corporate law by promulgating rules that seriously diminished its firms'
capacity to compete effectively. The damaged interests would seek
redress inside the state. They might succeed.
Or, consider a redistributive policy (unlikely, of course, but not
impossible) that would give in-state players a reason to resist correction.
If many of the corporations physically operated out-of-state, local
citizens would pay a small price for the costs of the state lawmakers'
corporate error. They might even benefit from the policy (and indeed
their benefit might have motivated the action in the first place), if the
error is, for example, a very high tax. The damaged firm could try to
reincorporate elsewhere. Standard theory suggests that this could be a
good remedy, although not a costless one. Moreover, the standard
American corporate format for reincorporation is for the board to
propose it and shareholders to then approve it. If the state's error is to
excessively favor one group over the other (for example, managers over
shareholders), one could imagine boards or shareholders trapped in a
state that is making corporate mistakes and has become unwilling to
correct them. One could also imagine the state lawmakers deliberately
raising the costs of reincorporating, and increasing the procedures needed
to do so, once they adopted an extractive policy.
The damaged firms might be unable to change the mistaken
state's law. They could then also turn to Congress for help. Congress,
after all, could preempt state corporate law with federal rules.
C. If Delaware Goes Awry
Consider the consequences if Delaware did the same. A simple
example is where the legislature leaves a judicial mistake uncorrected.
Out-of-state firms are those principally hurt in such scenarios. One could
also imagine something intentional (albeit unlikely): with many out-of-
state firms, errant politicians under pressure to close a budget gap seek to
extract value from those firms and simultaneously make it harder for
them to leave Delaware. After all, politicians' interests do not always
coincide with those of the states' firms, especially those firms whose
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businesses and employees are physically located out-of-state. One could
imagine easy self-justifications: "We built up American business with
our corporate law and we have rarely asked for much in return. The state
and its citizens are now facing hard times, so it is time that Delaware
corporations pay 1% of their multi-trillion assets to the state treasury for
each of the next three years, during which time there will be a
moratorium on out-of-state reincorporation."' 2 Such an extraction
possibility is extreme and unlikely, of course, but smaller errors and even
modest expropriations could still seriously damage American business.
The Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and
shareholder groups could all petition Delaware. They certainly would
have influence and should be quite credible when they say that this error
(or deliberate expropriation) will be a one-time deal, as the firms will one
way or another leave the jurisdiction. Local lawyers, representing not just
their clients' interests but their own, would want to correct the mistake or
reverse the heavy tax; they too would be influential. But one could
imagine state politicians remaining recalcitrant, either out of ignorance or
due to their own short-term goals. Such a scenario is unlikely but not
impossible, and it is useful to analyze the players that would enter if
extreme actions did transpire, as doing so can shed light on smaller
matters. The state might find a one-time expropriation valuable if it were
large enough. Approximately $9 trillion in market capitalization is
incorporated in Delaware, a state with an annual budget less than 1/2500
that size. 3 One wonders whether state budget officials have never mused
about corporate-based ways to close a budget gap.
The damaged firms, if faced with the unlikely possibility of an
errant but adamant Delaware, could turn to Congress for help.
12 Whether a straight moratorium would survive a Commerce Clause challenge could be
an issue. Presumably, the actual mechanism-were this hypothetical ever to become real-would
not be a straight moratorium, but a tightening of the internal corporate requirements for merger with
an out-of-state firm. For example, such a merger would be made to need, say, the approval of a
super-majority of the board of directors and of shareholders in two consecutive annual meetings.
Crafting such a rule so as not to apply broadly to all mergers would pose a drafting challenge.
13 This number pre-dates the current financial market disruptions. The market
capitalization of American public corporations was, recently, about $14 trillion. Wilshire.com, The
Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Composite Index, http://www.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000
/Characteristics.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). About 55% of NYSE and NASDAQ companies are
incorporated in Delaware. Maureen Milford, Delaware's Corporate Dominance Threatened, THE
NEWS J., Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=
/20080302/NEWS/803020319/l/imagine. If the size distribution of Delaware firms is about that of
all finns, the market capitalization of Delaware-incorporated firms approximates $9 trillion, a sum
that is about 2,500 times the size of the state's $3.4 billion 2009 budget. Delaware State Financial
Overview, http://budget.delaware.gov/fy2009/operating09opfinoverview.pdf. Recent stock market
declines would change the magnitude of the numbers substantially, but not change the fraction
by much.
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Ell. How WASHINGTON BACKSTOPS DELAWARE,
NOT OTHER STATES
The scenario to imagine is that two states have gone awry in
making corporate law; one state charters only a few large firms and the
other, Delaware, charters many. Cumulatively, Delaware's chartered
firms are critical to the American economy, while the other state's firms
are not. Consider how Washington would react to each.
Washington has reason to stabilize a shaky Delaware corporate
law, but it has much less reason to stabilize another state's corporate law.
Delaware's corporate law can affect the American economy in ways that
other states' corporate laws cannot. There are many business and
regulatory players inside and outside Delaware who would not want an
error to persist. Not so for other states' corporate law, which is not
important enough to assuredly induce Washington to backstop it.
A. Does Washington (Implicitly) Guarantee Sound Delaware
Corporate Law?
The greater federal interest reinforces Delaware's dominance.
Consider the prospect that a state other than Delaware errs grievously in
making corporate law, such that the state systematically hurts firms.
Every firm incorporated in the state, say, loses 10% of its value due to
the state egregiously erring in making corporate law.
But Congress is unlikely to try to save a few firms in a state with
only a few large firm charters. Congress is far more likely to act if that
state's corporate business is big enough for a powerful interest group to
move it up the national agenda or big enough to affect the national
economy. No state's corporate chartering business other than Delaware's
assuredly fits that description. Congress thus would have good reason to
try to stabilize Delaware, but it would not stabilize a small state with few
corporate charters.
This contrast, one can conjecture, could well affect the capacity
of states to enter the chartering market to compete strongly with
Delaware. A new state entrant would have trouble competing well
because it would lack the gravitas of being crucial to the American
economy.
One of Delaware's primary advantages, then, might simply be
that the density of Delaware's chartering gives the state a critical mass.
That critical mass is something that Washington's interests and
policymakers have reason not to allow to spin out of control. As a
consequence, it may well stay big because it already is big. Moreover, it
wants to avoid erosion of its corporate base, not only for its own sake,
but also so that it does not lose that critical mass. This is a complex
interaction between the states, Delaware, and Washington, one deserving
more attention than it has thus far received.
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The intuition here is that there is safety in numbers because
Delaware-or, more precisely, its corporate law-is too big to fail.
Delaware has many reasons to correct its own errors and many interests
that will press it to do so. These have been analyzed before. And it is the
only state that, if it erred in critical corporate matters, would be quite
likely to induce the federal cavalry into action to save corporate America.
B. Public Policy and the National Interests that Count
Consider the different economic stakes involved if a lesser
corporate state, say, Illinois, damages its corporations, as compared to
the damage that Delaware could do to the American economy. If Illinois
damaged its corporations by shackling them with a seriously substandard
corporate law, Illinois's lawmakers would not have created a national
economic problem but an Illinois problem. Members of Congress who
understood the problem could sympathize with the owners and
employees of Illinois's corporations, but they would not see it as a
national economic problem demanding resolution.
Not so if Delaware made the same mistake. By so erring,
Delaware would threaten the national economy. Congress would have a
strong reason to react. Conceivably, Washington's Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates of corporate governance structures could be seen as a pale
version of such a process, although I suspect Delaware players and
corporate critics of the act would see it neither as a fix, 4 nor, even if a
fix, as one fixing a Delaware problem. But Sarbanes-Oxley, even if it fits
the abstraction here only awkwardly, helps one to imagine what could
happen if Delaware did go awry. Congress has reasons to
shield corporate America from a major Delaware mistake but not an
Illinois one.
The analysis here is close to, but not identical to, the standard
notions of an institution being too big to fail, an issue that after this
article was first drafted became prominent in the news. Usually we think
of a financial institution as being too big to fail because the externalities
from its failure would damage too much else in the economy. So, the
government is willing to prop up the institution, sometimes by taking it
over, sometimes by arranging a merger, often by investing resources in
the failing institution. Here it is really Delaware's corporate law and not
Delaware itself that is too big to fail. If Delaware errs, or just does not
act when something important to the economy or important to a powerful
corporate interest occurs, federal authorities will not necessarily prop up
Delaware. Instead, federal authorities will simply make the rules directly,
14 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005).
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backstopping it. Delaware could indeed fail, but not America's
corporate law."5
The negative view of Sarbanes-Oxley presents a second channel
through which size alone makes Delaware too big to fail. The Delaware
players and the groups that represent them, such as the Business
Roundtable, often want to avoid federal action in corporate law, because
they think federal authorities will be likely to over-correct the local
problem. That potential for congressional over-reaction and error
motivates them to fix Delaware problems before they reach the national
agenda. 6 Other states and their corporate interests do not have the same
motivation.
Wronged Illinois businesses, managers, stockholders, and
employees could not command congressional attention outside of the
Illinois delegation. Wronged Delaware businesses, managers, stock-
holders, and employees-a large fraction of the American economy-
would.
C. Staying Big by Being Big?
This interaction need not be explicit, and I do not think it is (yet).
Firms and their managers could simply know that "everyone" is in
Delaware and that they are all in the same boat. So, something will
happen to correct the situation if Delaware's corporate law goes awry by
challenging a central corporate interest or by diminishing firms' legal
capacity to function well. Similarly, Delaware players need not explicitly
consider whether firms will incorporate elsewhere if there is a major
error, or whether federal authorities will intervene and embarrass them.
They only need to know that errors need to be corrected, for otherwise
the state will be penalized, financially or otherwise.
This analysis does not deny that Delaware has interests that want
to self-correct. Its judges and legislators are professionals. And
Delaware's lawyers are not interested, as a matter of pride and of self-
interest, in maintaining a substandard Delaware law that repels corporate
chartering in Delaware. They want to fix the problem locally because
they expect Washington will over-correct or mis-correct. But if Delaware
does not self-correct, another player has reasons to enter the fray.
This Delaware-Washington interaction creates another analytic
consideration. To be big, Delaware has to stay big. To the extent that this
implicit federal "guarantee" (or, to the extent local players fear
15 The recent financial crisis made me consider changing the title to Delaware's Back-
stop, as a title that would not evoke the crisis. But "too big to fail" does come close enough to the
Article's thesis and it means something to enough corporate academics that the original title stayed.
16 After the Enron and WorldCom scandals broke but before Congress passed Sarbanes-
Oxley, Delaware's Chief Justice Normand Veasey said that "[ilf we don't fix it, Congress will, but I
hope they've gone as far as they're going to have to go." What's Wrong with Executive
Compensation?, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan. 2003, at 68, 77 (comment of Norman E. Veasey).
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Washington, this implicit federal "threat") is important, Delaware must
stay big in order to keep the guarantee. If Delaware lost enough
corporate charters so that Congress considered it less important to protect
Delaware's corporations, then Delaware could lose even more charters.
At the limit, once Delaware slipped below some threshold and lost the
guarantee, it could be very hard for it to recover. It would then be seen as
too risky, not just for the standard reasons (lower chance of internal,
gyroscopic self-correction) but also because it would no longer have the
implicit federal guarantee (or the federal inducement to locals to fix the
problem to head-off Washington) once the number of Delaware-
incorporated firms no longer represented a key part of the American
economy.
And, if Delaware lost ground but did not collapse, instead merely
falling behind another state in what it thought would be a temporary
lapse, the other state might pick up steam because it would be seen as
more stable and, with more of the American economy attached to it,
could later find that its bigness became self-sustaining."
To summarize the primary arguments thus far: Delaware's
stability has been noted before. Previous analyses have focused on the
gyroscopic internal institutions that induce Delaware to be stable-such
as the influence of its corporate bar, the quality of its judiciary, and the
importance to the legislature of franchise tax revenues for the Delaware
state budget. Here I add an external stabilizing factor: Washington would
have strong reasons to steady American corporate law if something went
awry in Delaware. But if another state-like Illinois, Nevada, or even
California-stumbled badly, Congress would have weaker reasons to act
and would face weaker interest group-oriented pressures to do so.
Moreover, business and local interests, fearful of national over-reaction,
have reason to fix Delaware problems before they get onto the national
agenda.
This federal-state interaction that stabilizes Delaware is not yet
clearly distinguishable from the state-oriented features that have been
remarked upon before (the state's dependence on franchise fees, the
lawyers' interests, and network externalities). 8 In each instance we are
observing outcomes and deducing explanations for the outcomes. One
explanation may be in play without the other; one may be quite strong
17 This bigness feature helps to motivate Delaware to keep the franchise tax for larger
firms low. Since the large firms are more important to the American economy, they build up
Delaware's guarantee more than smaller firms that pay the same amount in franchise fees to
the state.
18 See generally Cary, supra note 1 (franchise fees); Romano, supra note 8 (franchise




and the other quite weak. Or each may be important. Evaluation of
impact remains for future analysis. But both the incentives of a federal-
state interplay and a purely internal (or state competitive) one are
present.
IV. How WASHINGTON LIMITS THE CONTESTABILITY OF THE STATE
INCORPORATION MARKET
Thus, Washington bolsters Delaware indirectly through two
related channels. First, Washington is more likely to react to a grievous
Delaware error than to a similar one in another state. Second,
Washington's hovering presence incentivizes local Delaware players,
who have reason to fear Washington action and over-correction, to re-
double their efforts to resolve the matter internally.
In this Part, I examine a related channel through which
Washington bolsters Delaware by dampening other states' capacity to
start competing with Delaware. To examine this channel, we first need to
see how industrial organization's contestable market theory applies to
state chartering competition. Then we see how Washington's presence
dampens other states' potential to contest Delaware. Some modes of
competitive entry would induce Washington to squelch competitive
entry.
A. What Is a Contestable Market?
William Baumol analyzed the industrial organization concept of
a contestable market, 9 and Scherer and Ross summarized it as follows:
When potential entrants have access to the same technology as
incumbents, when there are no sunk costs, and when a firm can enter and
exit the market before incumbents can respond, the market is said by
Baumol et al. to be perfectly contestable. The only sustainable price
available to incumbents under these conditions is one that just covers
average cost.
20
Delaware is not the incumbent in a perfectly contestable market.
Although all states have access to the same technology of making
corporate law, none waits actively in the wings, and Delaware could
respond to a new entrant quickly. 21 By responding, Delaware would
devalue a competing state's investment. With the potential competitor
19 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 163-65 (2002);
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WLLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 5 (rev. ed. 1988); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 82-83 (2002).
20 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 375-76 (3d ed. 1990).
21 Delaware's response capability corresponds to the stalking horse impediment to state
competition that Bebchuk and Hamdani emphasize. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 593-95.
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knowing that Delaware could react, the potential competitor has reason
not to do so.22
This general point-that Delaware's lock on the chartering
market is contestable-is one that has been remarked upon elsewhere.23
In particular, I have noted that there is vertical contestability in addition
to horizontal contestability: just as the risks of a state entering are low
but real, the chance of Washington acting further in corporate
governance in a contestable-markets-manner is real (but low). After all, it
does do so about every decade. 4 Moreover, the federal presence
establishes important limits on market contestability between states. We
see those limits after we first understand the mechanism that could make
Delaware's dominance contestable.
Washington simultaneously adds contestability (because it is
itself a player that can contest and displace Delaware's lawmaking) and
diminishes it (because Washington squelches some of the contestability
other states might try to introduce).
B. Sleeping Competitors
The no-competition perspective relies on Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Nevada being ineffective today as ongoing competitors of
Delaware for reincorporation chartering revenue. Although Delaware
might fumble, no state is close behind, ready to pick up the ball and run
with it. Delaware, when it stumbles, has time to react, pick itself up, and
fix the problem.
Yet, even if no other state's corporate law apparatus is structured
so that it could quickly capitalize on a Delaware offense to corporate
managers, maybe Delaware is still competing to keep its installed base,
albeit in another, weakened form. If it stumbled badly, it could induce
contestable-market-type competition for Delaware's existing installed
base.
1. Are States Waiting in the Wings?
Imagine that Delaware fumbled, but did not recover. Both
managers and shareholders are, let us posit, outraged at Delaware's Van
Gorkom decision, or another line of decisions, or some statutory
toughness. And they are annoyed and disappointed that Indiana, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and Nevada have done nothing to improve the
situation. No state is waiting in the wings, as Kahan and Kamar have
22 See id. at 595.
23 ROMANO, supra note 19, at 82-83; Roe, Does Delaware Compete?, supra note 7,
at 20.
24 See Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 6, at 600-34.
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shown; no state is watching whether Delaware fumbles so that it can rush
to pick up the ball.'
But that does not mean competition is nonexistent. State
competition might then start up as a sleeping competitor sees an
opportunity and acts before Delaware recovers. Delaware might
thereafter recover and imitate the new competitor, and that possibility,
indeed likelihood, of a Delaware reaction is one reason, as Bebchuk and
Hamdani have said,26 why other states do not have much of an interest in
being a stalking horse that would just induce Delaware to change its law
over the long run, rather than yield the new competitor much in the way
of corporate chartering revenue.
2. Van Gorkom and §102(b)(7)
The interplay between the Van Gorkom decision in 1985 and
Delaware's subsequent amendment to its corporate code via § 102(b)(7)
illustrates how Delaware reacts as if competing. In Van Gorkom, the
Delaware Supreme Court held a board liable for failing to sell a company
for as high a price as they otherwise might have.27 Corporate America
howled, and even institutional investors-who preferred a higher sales
price to a lower price-seemed not to want boards and managers to react
by becoming overly rigid. With the court-induced possibility of director
liability heightened, firms found it harder to buy directors' and officers'
insurance policies ["D&O"].28
The decision presented a nice competitive opportunity for
another state to fight with Delaware. But no state succeeded. The
Delaware legislature then eviscerated Van Gorkom via § 102(b)(7)29
(which allowed firms' shareholders to vote to limit directors' liability)
when the D&O insurance disruptions deepened and internal pressures to
25 Or, imagine something more threatening to Delaware's corporation business: business
changes in some way that half of the firms prefer rule X, and the other half not X, and there is no
good way to compromise. Delaware, no matter what it does in the competency arena, could find
itself facing unrest from half of its installed base.
Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 594-95.
27 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
28 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1155 (1990). Companies typically buy directors' and officers' insurance, which
reimburses the company's directors and officers for a range of their liability.
29 Whether Delaware reacted primarily to internal pressures, to the disruption in D&O
insurance, or to Indiana's reforms has been discussed. Compare Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van
Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random Mutations in the Evolution of
Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 267-68 (2006), with Kristin A. Linsley, Comment,
Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and
the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 527, 529 (1987), and Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not
in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 478 n. 140 (2007).
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change increased. Meanwhile, Indiana provided a safe haven from Van
Gorkom.
Delaware fumbled. But then, with corporate directors' and
officers' insurance rates rising and another state in the process of
changing its law on the issue, Delaware reacted. Delaware recovered and
turned the situation into a competitive advantage, as states that were slow
to emulate § 102(b)(7) lost more reincorporations to Delaware than did
other states.3
3. Must It Be a State That Instigates the Competition?
Imagine a stumbling and persistently recalcitrant Delaware that
does not recover after offending key corporate players. The offended
corporate players in Delaware could go to Rhode Island or South Dakota
or Nevada and make them an offer. Give us, they say, good chancery-
court-style judges (and we can provide a few from our law firms to you),
give us Delaware law (but without the offending provisions), and then
we will give you Delaware's tax revenues, $500 million per year.
Faced with the target state's reluctance to spend resources to
compete with Delaware (either for stalking horse reasons or local
political ones), the corporate players could write up a new corporations
code for Rhode Island, the corporate players could prepare to staff its
judiciary (especially its new commercial law courts), and the corporate
players could show local lawyers the corporate ropes. That is how the
contestable market would work: not via one states' bureaucracies and
legislatures competing directly with another's, but by the corporate
interests lobbying and instigating other states to act. It is no accident that
when North Dakota recently offered an alternative to Delaware's
corporate law, a law firm for interested parties presented the state with a
draft of a corporate law for the state legislature to consider.32
The fact that states are not actively competing for chartering
revenue does not mean that they could not compete, or that if Delaware
fumbled and did not recover quickly another state would not pick up the
ball, or that the offended players in Delaware would not and could not
act themselves to create a competitive state. Nor does the current absence
30 Butler, supra note 29, at 273-74; see also Roberta Romano, The States as a
Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG.
209, 221-22 (2006) (describing a more rapid Delaware self-correction).
31 Gordon Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors
from Liability? (Sept. 2004) (discussion paper, The Harvard John M. Olin Fellow's Discussion
Paper Series), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/fellows-papers/
pdf/Moodie-l.pdf; cf. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795,
1857-64 (2002) (noting that home state takeover law is a factor in whether Delaware can attract a
firm to reincorporate).
32 Martha Graybow, Delaware Beware: North Dakota Wants Your Business,




of an active competing state mean that Delaware is unaware that if it
stumbled, a viable competitor could emerge. Moreover, the offended
interest groups have reasons to devote resources to starting up a
competitor-even a stalking horse competitor that Delaware would co-
opt. The interest groups that benefit from changing corporate law would
win in either scenario: either Delaware changes, or a new more favorable
competitor arises. They have reason-if they can overcome their own
collective action problem-to instigate a state to compete, even if that
state has little reason to invest its own resources. Chambers of
Commerce, the American Bar Association, and Business Roundtable
committees, some financed by the relevant corporations, could provide
much of the start-up costs.
When one adds in the interest groups that could pressure another
state to act, the stalking horse problem, albeit real and important,
becomes less severe than it first seems to be. True, if the state bore most
of the corporate start-up costs, it might be reluctant to stalk and enter,
knowing that Delaware might in the end match it. But if the interest
groups bore those costs, they would mitigate the stalking horse problem
enough to get another state started. The Business Roundtable of the
Chamber of Commerce could commission a law firm or a City Bar
Association to study the problem and draft a model code as a response.
Even if a state has reason to be wary of incurring up-front costs in
starting up its chartering capacity, the corporate players could sensibly
incur a good part of the costs themselves and start up state competition.
4. New Jersey at the Beginning of the 20th Century
This contestable market strand roughly corresponds to how
interstate competition once happened, when New Jersey, with the lion's
share of the reincorporation business at the beginning of the 20th
century, changed the nature of its corporate regulation. New Jersey had
provided a corporate law favorable to the organization of nationwide
industry (by easing cross-state mergers and holding companies).
Delaware imitated New Jersey's structure, but few firms moved. Then, in
the context of 1912 presidential politics, Woodrow Wilson induced the
New Jersey legislature to be tougher, for antitrust reasons, on nationwide
firms. This induced corporate America to flee from New Jersey to
Delaware. The move was swift. The corporate chartering market was
contested and one near-monopolist replaced another.33
Two states vied for the corporate charter business. And nearly all
at once, one state won. The chartering market was then a contestable
market in theory and in fact. There was a contest, and one state displaced
another.
33 I recount the New Jersey to Delaware history in Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra
note 6, at 609-10.
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5. Marty Lipton's Threat
Fast forward to nearly a century later for another illustration. The
hostile takeover in the 1980s was the overarching corporate transaction.
It seemed at the time to be an issue big enough to influence corporations
in their state chartering decisions. Many states responded to their local
corporations' and managers' goals by passing tough antitakeover laws.
Yet, Delaware did little to match other states' antitakeover laws in the
mid-1980s. It did little because it was undecided (takeover policy was
controversial), because its primary interest groups did not agree, and
perhaps because it wanted to head off the threat of federal action, which
it might have set off if it acted sharply.4
When its Chancery Court wrote a strong pro-takeover opinion35
and its legislature ignored calls to pass antitakeover laws, Delaware
faced the threat of exit, as evidenced by Martin Lipton's famous public
proposal for firms to reincorporate out of Delaware. The demands of the
race were made clear to Delaware. In Lipton's words, in a memo sent to
his clients:
The Interco case and the failure of Delaware to enact an effective
takeover statute[] raise a very serious question as to Delaware
incorporation. New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, are
far more desirable states for incorporation than Delaware in this
takeover era. Perhaps it is time to migrate out of Delaware.
36
How much of this was threat and how much bluff is hard to
assess, as both managers and shareholders would have had to approve
firms going through the reincorporation exit. Whether Lipton and, say,
the Business Roundtable would have geared up to show a small state like
Rhode Island-or New Jersey again-how to make corporate law is hard
to say. Keep in mind that law firms frequently undertake such public
service ventures, some of which coincide with their clients' interests. Bar
association committees, model law drafting, and American Law Institute
activities can fit this model.
These players had the resources to do so. And for some time,
they had the motivation. Then Delaware passed an antitakeover law and
34 Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE 321, 340-47 (Margaret Blair
ed., 1993); Roe, Delaware's Competition, supra note 6, at 632.
35 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch. 1988).
36 Letter from M. Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to clients (Nov. 3, 1988) (on
file with author); see also Stephen Labaton, The "Poison Pill" Takes a Beating, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1988, at D2; Roger Parloff, The Outlook of Poison Pills: After Interco and Pillsbury, What
Next?, MANHATrAN LAW., Jan. 24-30, 1989, at 31; Tim Smart, For Managers, Delaware Isn't the
Haven It Used To Be, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 1988, at 33 ("[L]egal advisers to worried managers
already are suggesting that companies should consider playing elsewhere .... "); Charles Storch,
As Company, Time Focusing on 1 Newsmaker, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 1989, at 8 (reporting that
Delaware's blocking Interco management from using the pill "so enraged Martin Lipton, the lawyer




its Supreme Court wrote antitakeover decisions, most prominently that in
Time-Warner,37 which explicitly rejected Interco. Hostile takeovers
declined in frequency, perhaps because of economic reasons, and talk of
firms exiting Delaware stopped.
C. Visibility
That is how a contestable market would work in the United
States: the corporate interests that want a new competitor would provide
the resources to a state to compete. Competition would not necessarily
come from a state acting sua sponte. There are analogues beyond
assessing motives and opportunities here: when Citibank needed a state
to modernize its usury laws for credit cards, it approached South Dakota,
which went along. When investor groups thought they might want a
more pro-shareholder corporate law, they approached North Dakota and
did not wait for a state to act on its own.
This potential for maneuvering does mean Delaware could face a
contestable-market-type bid, one that limits Delaware's discretion. But
this kind of maneuvering would attract federal attention, as federal
scrutiny would provide Delaware with further too-big-to-fail protection.
Why, federal players would ask, are firms running from
Delaware? The contest, if it broke out, especially if it broke out via
transparent interest group pushes, would be salient, media-worthy, and, if
the movement seemed, for example, motivated mainly by surreptitious
managerial protection, could instigate federal actors. While managers
often win at the federal level, the mix of interests in Washington differs
from that at the state level,38 so the interstate maneuvering would have to
be accomplished in a way that federal actors found tolerable. They might
not find the raw state action tolerable, and, hence, they might stymie the
contestability of the market. They might in fact find that the maneuvering
is a reason to takeover making that part of American corporate law.
Hence, there are limits to contestability beyond the obvious ones.
The process most likely to work-interest groups providing the
foundation for another state's corporate entry-is likely to be the most
visible, the most likely to attract media attention, and hence the most
likely to attract Congress's attention. When Congress's attention is
captured, the odds that Congress would make the relevant contested rule
a national one increases. If Washington makes the rule a national one, it
closes that field for state contestability.
As political scientists have said in a related context, much
congressional action can be seen as divided between responses to police
37 Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989).
38 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2499 (2005).
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patrols and fire alarms.39 Police patrols are expensive and 535 members
of Congress cannot be well-informed on every issue of significance to
the country. But sometimes fire alarms go off and Congress reacts. A
massive, interest-group driven effort to create an alternative to Delaware
for reincorporation would be the fire alarm that would attract Congress's
attention. While the interest groups making state corporate law also have
clout in Congress, they are not the only players with congressional clout.
If a reincorporation move was convincingly portrayed in the media as,
for example, mostly motivated by managers' desire to protect their
excessive compensation, it is easy to imagine that the media fire alarms
would go off, that Congress would hear them, and that this possibility
would weaken this dimension for contestable market competition in the
first place. For the market to be made contestable, the stakes have to be
raised. And when the players raise the stakes, they increase the chances
that Congress will notice. If Congress notices and acts, the contested
issue would disappear as a bone of competitive contention between two
(or more) states, because Washington would then own the issue.
Federal contestability interacts with state contestability,
dampening the latter, especially by limiting vividly scurrilous state
competition.
CONCLUSION: ISN'T DELAWARE'S CORPORATE LAW TOO BIG TO FAIL?
In this Article I have analyzed the stability of state actions when
there is a federal player who can trump them. The interplay is that the
federal authorities act as an implicit guarantor of Delaware's basic
soundness but not of other states' soundness. Other states might make
corporate law that is bad for their firms, either due to state error or,
worse, intentional extraction. But even if such states do so, their actions
would not rise to be a federal issue. Delaware, though, as home to half of
the corporate economy, could not make a serious error or threaten an
influential corporate interest without there being consequences. If the
issue was perceived as affecting economic well-being, Washington
would likely react to steady the economy. Moreover, Delaware interests
have reason to work harder to avoid federal action, either because they
(the local interests) would be adversely affected by Washington's action,
or because they fear that once Washington acted, it would over-react and
make more egregious mistakes. Hence, one structural source of
Delaware's stability is not simply the internal mechanism of the state
corporate lawmaking structure, but also the existence of a federal
backstop. Delaware's corporate law might fail, but its corporate law is
too big for Washington to allow Delaware to severely hurt the American
economy.
39 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC1. 165, 165-66 (1984).
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